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Abstract: Alexander Betts and Paul Collier’s book Refuge is focused on the 
problems of the present, and presents ambitious plans for the future. But the 
claims it makes about the causes of the crisis of European refugee policy in 
2015, and the longer-term problems of what the authors call the ‘broken 
refugee system’, are historical. This essay offers a critical reading of the book 
from a historian’s perspective. It shows that the authors fundamentally 
misrepresent the history of the refugee system in order to attack the 1951 
UN Refugee Convention, the agency (UNHCR) tasked with implementing the 
convention, and the entire rights-based approach to refugee protection. 
Presenting itself as a hard-headed and realistic plan for reform, the book is a 
tendentious polemic whose main concern is to assert the primacy of states’ 
interests—especially the interest of rich states in keeping refugees out. 
Keywords: Refugees, UN Refugee Convention, UNHCR, Alexander Betts, Paul 
Collier, Refuge: transforming the broken refugee system 
 
Alexander Betts and Paul Collier’s Refuge, rushed to print after the crisis of European 
refugee policy in 2015, is focused on the present and future. But history matters in 
this book, from the historical claim that frames it to the concluding thoughts. The 
authors diagnose the failings of the existing refugee system with a brief history of its 
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emergence and development, and skewer the errors of European policymakers with 
a history of the events of summer 2015. They present their reform proposals as new 
(an implicit historical claim), and finish the book with a counterfactual narrative of 
what the history of the “crisis” might have been had they already been adopted. 
How does all this history stack up? 
 
The historical claim that frames the book has become a commonplace: “There are 
more people displaced than at any time since the Second World War” (1), over 20 
million refugees out of a total of 65 million including internally displaced people. This 
statistic has popped up everywhere since UNHCR, the UN refugee agency, published 
it in 2016 (UNHCR 2016: 2 and passim). But it needs to be treated with caution. The 
situations that make people flee their homes also make it hard to count them. 
Double counting is common, and inevitable, as individuals are repeatedly displaced. 
UNHCR has fairly robust figures for the total number of refugees (people displaced 
across a border) going back to the 1950s, when its mandate was much narrower, but 
it only took responsibility for assisting internally displaced persons in the 1990s—the 
earliest formal statement I have found is from 1994 (UNHCR 1994).1 Before then, 
attempts to count IDPs, who make up the bulk of the total, were sporadic. We don’t 
actually know if more people are displaced today than at any time since the late 
1940s.2 
 
We can say, though, that the comparison of the two periods is unhelpful. By the end 
of the second world war, out of a global population of somewhere over 2 billion, 
between 100 and 200 million people were displaced: tens of millions in Europe, as 
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many as 95 million in China (Reinisch 2013: 72). If we take the 65 million figure as 
accurate for 2016, it is considerably lower in absolute terms, but much smaller in 
relative terms. The global population today is over 7 billion; the global economy is 
vastly larger, and states, international agencies, and NGOs are incomparably better 
equipped to assist displaced people. The comparison with the 1940s is not helpful, 
except perhaps for illustrating how much more manageable are today’s problems of 
displacement. But Betts and Collier use the comparison rhetorically, to create a 
sense of crisis—one that demands, indeed necessitates, the solutions they propose. 
 
Why, in this book’s telling, is the “refugee system” as currently constituted not fit to 
meet this challenge? Here we have our first historical account for diagnostic 
purposes: it is failing because it is stuck in the past. The keystone of international 
protection, the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, was designed to assist individual 
victims of persecution, essentially political refugees from communist regimes. It was 
not intended to assist the whole populations lastingly displaced by conflict or state 
failure that are characteristic of our age of “global disorder” (ch1): little wonder that 
states increasingly ignore it. UNHCR, meanwhile, tasked with overseeing the 
Convention’s application, is hidebound, self-interested, and wedded to an outmoded 
model of humanitarian assistance distributed through refugee camps—a model 
suitable for emergency relief in the 1980s developing world (41), where it emerged, 
but not for today’s prolonged displacement crises. Most refugees try and avoid 
camps, and so fall off UNHCR’s radar; those who don’t avoid them see their lives 
placed “on hold” for generations. 
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The problem with this diagnosis is that it is wrong on every level. The 1951 
Convention emerged from the recognition that interwar efforts to assist displaced 
populations—not individuals—had failed, most catastrophically for the Jews of 
Germany. Its definition of “refugee” explicitly embraces those populations covered 
by earlier, more specific legal instruments: Russian exiles denationalized by the 
Bolshevik regime, post-Ottoman Armenians, and German Jews. It then extends to 
include anyone who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”. This universal 
definition, still valid, was designed to assist whole populations displaced by conflict 
and state collapse in an age of much greater “global disorder” than today. But it did 
not offer any assistance to cold war dissidents: it was subject to a temporal 
limitation, applying only to people displaced before 1 Jan 1951 (UN 1951: article 1). 
 
The misleading claim that the Convention is a cold war instrument targeting 
individuals is not a one-off error (4, 5, 6, 9, 34, 36-38, 40, and later). Nor is it a 
technicality: it is a fundamental misrepresentation of the origins of modern 
international refugee law. The 1951 Convention is a complex and nuanced legal 
instrument that has sparked considerable debate and substantive legal and socio-
legal scholarship (Goodwin-Gill 2014; Van Selm et al. 2003). But Betts and Collier 
offer no engagement with that scholarship: they are deeply impatient with the law, 
and dismissive of rights-based approaches to refugee protection. Instead, they 
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repeatedly argue that the Convention is outmoded based on this origin story. But 
their origin story is wrong.  
 
The limitations on the 1951 Convention deserve discussion. One was temporal. The 
other was geographic: though global in reach, the Convention only applied to people 
displaced from within Europe. Both restrictions were removed by the 1967 Protocol, 
which recognized the new and persistent displacements occurring across the world. 
By then, UNHCR was already operating far beyond its original mandate, and it is 
worth stressing how that came about. When 190,000 Hungarian refugees fled into 
Austria in the winter of 1956–7, the country asked UNHCR for technical and 
diplomatic assistance: a new refugee crisis in Europe highlighted the problem of the 
temporal limitation (Zieck 2013). At around the same time, Morocco and Tunisia 
asked UNHCR to assist them with some 200,000 refugees from the French war in 
Algeria: a crisis beyond Europe highlighted the problem of the geographical 
limitation (Ruthström-Ruin 1993: chapters 3-4). The fact that the refugee system 
extended beyond Europe at the request of newly-independent North African states 
undermines Betts and Collier’s repeated claim that the Convention is Eurocentric (5, 
34, 39). Later regional agreements cited as evidence that the 1951 Convention is 
outdated and Eurocentric, like the Organization of African Unity’s Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969) or the 
Organization of American States’ Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (1984), rely 
heavily on it, too (OAU 1969; OAS 1984).3  
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This history also tells us something crucial: the international refugee system will 
extend, and function, only as far as states allow it to. The Convention was extended 
in time and space because states wanted this; UNHCR’s operations have consistently 
outrun its legal mandate because states have invited or requested its intervention. 
Similarly, states can hinder or ignore the Convention, and constrain UNHCR’s actions. 
You would not know this from Betts and Collier’s account, however. They depict 
UNHCR as a wholly autonomous actor, “adapting incrementally—through 
opportunistic and occasionally pathological [sic] means” (38). For them, this 
“opportunism”, not the increasing demands placed on it by the growing number of 
UN member states, explains the agency’s expansion between 1950 and 2016 from 
500 to over 9000 employees. (The authors make no effort to square their depiction 
of this ‘opportunistic’ expansion with their claim that the displaced populations the 
agency must support are unprecedentedly large.) 
 
There are many grounds for criticizing UNHCR, and there is lively debate about how 
to make the agency more effective among practitioners, including UNHCR staff, and 
researchers. There is no point in rehearsing that debate here, though, because once 
again, Betts and Collier neither engage with it nor offer a serious and evidenced 
critique. Instead, they sketch a crude caricature based on a willful misrepresentation 
of the agency’s history, making no effort to examine the ways in which host states 
and donor states constrain its actions. Their analysis of why so many refugees’ lives 
are stuck on hold never seriously addresses the key actors, state governments. Not 
coincidentally, there is no evidence in this book that they interviewed a single 
member of UNHCR staff as they assembled this hatchet job. (As we will see, they 
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spoke to few if any refugees, either.) The question of sources is, of course, an 
important one for a historian. 
 
Camps, meanwhile, are not UNHCR’s invention: states around the world have used 
them to contain refugees since at least the first world war, as Britain did—using 
adapted and purpose-built facilities—both in the UK and further afield (British 
Government War Refugees’ Camp 1920; Austin 1920). The agency may rely too 
heavily on them as a convenient tool for delivering humanitarian assistance, but it 
understands their limitations. It has developed and revised a policy on urban 
refugees to reach those who avoid camps, and explicitly seeks alternatives to camps 
where possible (UNHCR 1997; UNHCR 2009; UNHCR 2015; Crisp 2017).4 But in all too 
many cases, alternatives are not possible: not because UNHCR is self-interestedly 
wedded to the camp (“Camps provided jobs: just not for refugees”, 41), but because 
states continue to insist on containing and segregating refugees. If it wants to assist 
refugees, the agency often has no choice but to cooperate with states’ efforts to 
contain them.  
 
The authors’ diagnosis of the causes of the current refugee “crisis” is equally 
misleading. Their chapter on “Global disorder” gives a superficial and very partial 
overview of the causes of increasing state fragility in parts of the world. For example, 
an abstract process called resource extraction “increases the risk of violent conflict” 
(23). But no companies actually do it, or suborn local state officials or sponsor armed 
opposition groups to ease their operations; no rich-country governments stage 
armed interventions to ensure access to such “resources”; no rich-country 
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consumers create the market for them. Similarly, “the rapid spread of lopsided 
democracy” (20) has produced governments in countries like Iraq and Libya that no 
longer have the autocrat’s resort to violence, but lack popular legitimacy. But this is 
presented as a failure internal to those societies: there is no discussion of the role 
externally-imposed sanctions and bombing, recent foreign military interventions, 
and continued meddling by regional or global powers may have played in creating 
the conditions for state collapse. It is not that the problems Betts and Collier identify 
do not exist. But they are highly selective both in the problems they choose to 
identify (“supremacist Islam” is a bad thing that creates instability; racist Buddhist 
nationalisms in Sri Lanka or Myanmar are not mentioned, though hundreds of 
thousands of refugees have fled those countries5) and in their attribution of blame 
for them. 
 
The account of the 2015 “panic” (ch. 3) is more specific, but even more tendentious. 
The chapter begins with an account of the dissonance that emerged between the 
free movement of goods and labor within the Schengen area, on the one hand, and 
the policies and practices intended to manage the arrival of asylum-seekers in EU 
countries, on the other. This is serviceable enough, though strikingly focused on 
effective control (ie, prevention) of immigration. The view of the rest of the world—
”conflict-prone regions” like the Middle East and North Africa (66); “zones of 
instability” like Central Asia, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa with their “enormous 
populations” (66); the “ocean of poverty” in “the countries of the Sahel and beyond 
them the highly populated states of West and Central Africa” (68)—is the view from 
an armed stockade. It is perilously close to a long tradition of European racist 
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discourse about the demographic threat of the global south (Chatterton Williams 
2017), whose key texts include Jean Raspail’s racist apocalyptic novel Le camp des 
saints, newly popular with the far right across Europe and America (Raspail 1973; 
Moura 1988; Polakow-Suransky 2017: 4–5, 291–296).  
 
The analysis of the proximate cause of the “crisis”, the Arab uprisings since 2011, is 
shakier. We learn that the uprisings did not overthrow any monarchies because 
“although autocratic, the monarchies of the Middle East had significant on-the-
ground legitimacy” (71)—which may or may not be true, but most of them also had 
enormous cash resources for buying off opposition, unlimited foreign backing for 
repressing it, or both. Much worse is the historical narrative of the events of summer 
2015. For Betts and Collier, the “crisis” was that EU refugee policy was no longer 
effectively keeping refugees out. The stockade appeared, for a moment, to be 
breached. Searching for someone to blame, the authors fix an extraordinary degree 
of responsibility on the German chancellor, Angela Merkel: her decision to accept 
Syrian refugees is presented not as a reaction to but as the primary cause of refugee 
flows into Europe. 
 
There is a strong undercurrent of misogyny here. No male politician is treated with 
the same hostility that Collier and Betts reserve for Merkel, not even authoritarian 
racist demagogues like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. She is their prime example of the 
“headless heart”, as though the canniest and most calculating politician in Europe 
were a giddy little girl. (The simplistic formula of the “headless heart” and “heartless 
head” becomes extremely wearing with repetition.) Observers hostile to Merkel 
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have noted that her decision, though it risked stoking the far right, buttressed the 
chancellor’s centrist position in the short term by drawing support from parties on 
the left (Streeck 2016). Longer-term considerations may also have figured: the cost 
of refugee integration serves as fiscal stimulus to the German economy, while 
German policymakers are keenly aware that with its aging population the country 
requires one of its periodic mass influxes of foreign labor (Fratzscher and Junker 
2015; OECD 2015; Trines 2017).6 Take a broader view than Betts and Collier, with 
their blinkered focus on the danger of mass immigration, and there is plenty to 
suggest that Merkel’s decision was based not on the “headless heart” but on her 
usual hard-headed (if hasty) calculation of her own and Germany’s self-interest.  
 
The authors’ obsession with the specter of immigration also means that they 
caricature the effects of Merkel’s decision to open Germany’s borders. This, they 
say, triggered a mass movement of refugees, splintering the EU’s fragile unity, 
tipping the balance for “leave” in the UK’s Brexit referendum and causing 
“thousands of deaths due to drowning” (109) among the refugees. This account pins 
responsibility for structural problems in EU and British politics on the new arrivals, 
but makes Angela Merkel responsible for countless individual decisions taken by 
Syrian refugees. Because of their stockade mentality, Collier and Betts have no 
interest in understanding events in the world outside—in this case, in Syria and 
neighboring countries. To understand the rising numbers of Syrians trying to get to 
Europe in the summer of 2015, and to find someone to blame, they search within 
Europe and settle on Merkel (a chief instance of the book’s own thoroughgoing 
Eurocentrism). Like most anti-immigration scaremongers, they enormously overstate 
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the importance of “pull” factors but show little understanding of the complex 
dynamics that influence individuals’ decision to leave. 
 
Between 2011 and 2015, the Assad regime, whose ruthless bombing of civilian 
populations has been the principal cause of displacement from Syria (Gutman and 
Raymon 2013; Balanche 2018: 24), had steadily lost ground. Drastically 
overstretched and unable to command more than a cowed acquiescence from most 
of the people under its control, it was slowly decaying. But in the summer of 2015 its 
external allies, Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia, ramped up their support for a key 
strategic partner. Meanwhile, whatever lukewarm support America and the 
European states had offered the Syrian opposition since 2011 rapidly withered after 
ISIS rose to prominence in 2014: Assad successfully presented himself as a lesser evil 
(Hersh 2016).7 This ensured that, while the regime was still not in a position to win 
the war, it was no longer of losing it (to exhaustion if not to a divided opposition).  
 
For the millions of Syrians who were already refugees in neighboring countries, this 
changed their calculations. Before 2015, Syrians who fled could reasonably hope that 
the regime would collapse in the medium term, allowing them to go home. By the 
middle of 2015 that hope was wavering. (Russia’s air campaign, from September 
2015, postponed it indefinitely.) At the same time, the situation in Turkey, Lebanon, 
and Jordan was worsening. All those countries had done a remarkable job of 
welcoming and hosting huge numbers of Syrians. But as more time went by and their 
numbers only grew, Syrians could sensibly assume that their welcome would wear 
thin. Popular and political hostility was likely to increase, and with prices rising fast, 
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and access to employment limited at best, their economic situation was also steadily 
deteriorating. 
 
In this diplomatic, political, and economic context, and with rich countries neither 
adequately supporting the “havens” nor resettling more than paltry numbers of 
Syrians themselves, it was not surprising that many Syrian refugees with the means 
to do so decided to move on. Germany’s decision to accept refugees, once the latter 
had begun walking through the Balkans in large numbers, may have influenced the 
direction of travel within the EU, but it emphatically did not “cause” their departure 
from the region itself. Nor did it cause a “huge… expansion in the people-smuggling 
business” (228), or thousands of deaths by drowning: those are caused by EU 
immigration restrictions and the absence of legal safe passage. Betts and Collier 
condemn the market distortions that refugee camps create in poor countries (159), 
but they are dead set on maintaining and reinforcing the vastly greater distortions 
created by rich-country immigration restrictions.  
 
The story so far could hardly be bettered as an example of tendentious historicizing. 
To recap: the book starts with a misleading historical claim about the scale of current 
displacement. It gives an account of the existing system of refugee protection that is 
based on an unsustainable set of historical claims about that system’s origin and 
development, ignoring the role played in its functioning and malfunctioning by the 
principal actors, namely states. Then comes a partial historical account of the events 
of summer 2015, skewed by the authors’ obsession with keeping immigrants from 
poorer countries, whether refugees or not, out of Europe. Betts and Collier assemble 
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a grab-bag of historical “evidence”, but display no actual historical thinking: no 
concern to establish an accurate chronology, examine and contextualize a range of 
different sources, or question the motives of the actors involved; no testing of 
counter-hypotheses; no attempt to understand complexity, rather than impose a 
monocausal explanation on the path of events. This is a weak foundation for their 
ambitious plan to reform the “broken refugee system”. 
 
That plan is buttressed by another unsustainable historical claim: that it represents a 
“new approach” (9), a “new paradigm” (9). The refugee system, the authors say, 
needs to address displacement as a development opportunity: instead of treating 
refugees as passive objects of pity, UNHCR and other agencies should unleash 
refugees’ potential as productive economic actors. But this is precisely what major 
institutional actors in refugee protection have argued in every decade since the 
1920s, when League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Fridtjof Nansen 
planned to resettle 50,000 Armenian refugees in a vast agricultural project in the 
Soviet Caucasus (Hope Simpson 1939: 36-38; Marrus 2002: 119-21; Laycock 
forthcoming). In 1967, as UN high commissioner, the Aga Khan stressed that 
refugees could “become a great asset to their new country provided they can be 
included in the constructive work of development, rather than being allowed to 
remain in idleness in camps at the expense of the international community” (Aga 
Khan 1967). UNHCR’s current policies on supporting urban refugees and avoiding 
refugee camps are underpinned by similar thinking. But the success or otherwise of 
such projects and policies has never been in the control of the agencies involved: 





After the historical framing of Part I, the authors proceed to a “rethink” of the 
refugee system in Part II, which makes up the bulk of the book. With “four big new 
ideas” (11), Betts and Collier address the ethics of refugee protection, the “havens” 
where most refugees live, the best means of assisting them while incubating post-
conflict recovery, and the international institutions that must step up to the plate.  
 
The chapter on ethics (ch. 4) is particularly problematic. Its misrepresentation of the 
ethics of refugee protection is evident from its subtitle, “The Duty of Rescue”, and 
from the simplistic analogy the authors use to illuminate it. Our responsibility 
towards refugees, Betts and Collier say, is like that of a bystander towards a child 
drowning in a pond: we have a duty to get them out of the water, perhaps to dry 
them off and find clean clothes, but we should feel no obligation to house them till 
they turn 18 then put them through college. This is a pat analogy that implicitly 
infantilizes refugees, based on the questionable assumption that a thought 
experiment involving an individual in peril can usefully elucidate the ethics of 
responding to mass displacement. It is also obviously false. Refugees are not passive 
victims, like a child stuck in a pond who needs to be rescued. They are people who 
have rescued themselves—who have got out of danger by seeking refuge elsewhere. 
The ethics of refugee protection is not about a “duty of rescue” at all.  
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The rest of the chapter ostensibly sets itself the goal of distinguishing between the 
categories of “refugee” and “migrant”, while actually working energetically to 
conflate them. There is no mention of the right of refuge, no reference to the rights 
of refugees (as enshrined in the 1951 Convention), and no discussion of whether 
these can ethically be sustained, but there is a long section (110-117) arguing that 
there is no fundamental right to migrate. The chapter, like the book as a whole, 
seeks to bypass the issue of rights, which can be legally protected, and focuses 
instead on subordinating global refugee law to rich-country immigration restrictions. 
They speak of creating a hard-headed but compassionate “partnership based on 
comparative advantage and fair burden-sharing” (107-108): its purpose is to keep 
refugees out of rich countries. 
 
Having set out their atrophied notion of ethics, and dispensed with the notion of 
rights, Betts and Collier move on to their reform proposals. By comparison with their 
stinging critique of the existing system, these are blandly technocratic. They are also 
wholly unrealistic, because Betts and Collier continue to ignore the role within that 
system of its principal actors, states. They start with “havens”—the countries like 
Turkey and Uganda where most refugees live, and where the authors would prefer 
them to stay. But most host states are unwilling to grant refugees full access to the 
labor market, as the 1951 Convention requires. Betts and Collier are unwilling to 
challenge states or defend refugees’ rights under the Convention, so they propose 
“special enterprise zones”, where refugees can be set to work without being given 
free access to either the labor market or whatever legal protections the host states 
afford citizen workers. Multinational companies will be attracted to invest in 
 16 
production, as well they might when offered a captive and rightless labor force, 
while rich-country consumers can “buy refugee” and congratulate themselves on 
their ethical shopping. This solution apparently went down well with “the world’s 
business leaders at Davos” (ix), and you can see why, but it is not a plausible plan. 
 
Can refugees’ rights be adequately defended under this plan? Obviously not. Betts 
and Collier glibly assert that “there is no reason why the model could not be adapted 
to ensure respect for human rights and consistency with a set of ethical practices”, 
but give no concrete details of how that “respect” might be ensured. They say that 
“the model should not function on the basis of any kind of coercion but offer 
sufficiently attractive opportunities to attract refugees to choose to work within and 
live close to these spaces” (173), but give no thought to the inherent coerciveness of 
allowing refugees to work in an SEZ but barring their access to a livelihood anywhere 
else. In a book that is so dismissive of the rights-based refugee regime, these weak 
gestures are mere window-dressing. 
 
There are, anyway, more practical obstacles. Betts and Collier are seeking to “create 
a ‘win–win’ outcome that suits both Northern donors and Southern hosts” (151)—a 
formula that strikingly ignores refugees. To be successful, such a model needs to 
operate “at scale” (passim): that is, to make a difference to tens of millions of lives. 
There is no evidence that it can. Setting up a pilot project in Jordan is one thing: the 
Hashemite Kingdom, a foreign policy minnow, is a relatively stable state firmly in the 
economic and diplomatic orbit of the EU and USA. It hosts about 650,000 Syrian 
refugees as well as tens of thousands of Iraqis (not to mention Palestinians). Iran, 
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meanwhile, hosts just under a million, Pakistan well over a million, Sudan over 
400,000.8 Will the major western states allow special enterprise zones in Iran and 
Sudan to employ refugees, to the benefit of both countries’ economies (and rulers)? 
No, for the same reason that Britain and France scotched Fridtjof Nansen’s plan to 
resettle Armenian refugees in the Soviet Caucasus: because they viewed it as a huge 
tranche of economic development funding for an enemy state. State interests 
override humanitarian concerns. 
 
I mention states first because Betts and Collier persistently neglect the role of states 
as key actors in every sphere they describe. But even more culpable is their neglect 
of refugees. Overwhelmingly, in this book, refugees feature in the abstract. A few 
individuals are mentioned by name, like the “young man named Abdi [who] runs a 
small video games studio” (163) at Nakivale camp in Uganda, or Munyompenza, “a 
Rwandan businessman who has expanded his maize-milling business over many 
years” (164). These are cheerful and simplistic caricatures of entrepreneurial 
refugees, and Betts and Collier neither ask their opinion, nor give any information 
about how and when they encountered them. Even in the tiny number of cases 
where they quote a refugee directly, like Farid at Zaatari camp (129), source 
information is not always given: was he talking to them, or are they quoting from 
someone else’s work? As far as I can tell, only two footnotes in the book refer to 
direct conversations with refugees. One of the people they mention appears to be 
fictional: “Amira, a Syrian refugee whose situation is typical of many” (8). 
Meanwhile, the authors find space to cite, and credit, any number of individual 
authority figures, mostly white and almost all male. Achim Dercks, “of the 
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Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce”, gets to give his views 
on Syrian refugees in Germany (134). But no Syrian refugees in Germany are asked 
for their views of Achim Dercks.  
 
Absent any meaningful engagement with actual refugees, Betts and Collier provide 
no credible evidence that this plan would be acceptable to them. Here, though, we 
can draw some lessons from their pilot programmed in Jordan, small-scale project in 
a small country though it is. The Jordan Compact has been running since 2016, with 
limited success (Howden et al. 2017; Barbelet et al. 2018). Offering refugees legal 
work in the King Hussein bin Talal Development Area does not help them get there 
on Jordan’s tenuous public transport network. The kind of work available there is not 
necessarily suitable, either for the university-educated Syrians that Betts and Collier 
are so keen to keep out of Germany or for the rural populations who represent a 
large proportion of Syrian refugees in northern Jordan, whose expertise lies in 
agricultural and not factory work. And in a state like Jordan, an authoritarian regime 
with a highly informal economy, refugees may think twice about committing to a job 
that comes at the whim of the government and requires them to expose themselves 
fully to the state bureaucracy. There are many reasons why a refugee might prefer 
to fall back on a combination of humanitarian assistance, however limited, and 
casual but discreet work in the informal economy. The Compact has created 
relatively few jobs, and as I drafted this piece the Jordanian government announced 
a limited but much less rigid system of work permits for Syrian refugees—
accompanied, however, by a spike in the number of expulsions.9 
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The proposals for incubating post-conflict reconstruction and reforming 
international governance are more weakly articulated still. It is not controversial to 
suggest that support for refugees from a war-zone should attempt to incubate skills 
and capabilities that will assist with post-conflict reconstruction. But whether SEZs 
can achieve that is doubtful: Betts and Collier want everyone from shepherds to 
obstetricians to be working in the relatively narrow range of jobs these zones can 
support, and in conditions that minimize their control over their own lives. The 
authors express enthusiasm for refugee “entrepreneurialism”, in its proper place, 
which is to say in poor and middle-income countries. (They do not consider it 
“entrepreneurial” when a Syrian refugee weighs up the costs and benefits and 
decides to invest in a risky but potentially rewarding journey to Europe.) But they 
quickly leave Abdi and Munyompenza behind as they outline the airy contours of 
their SEZ plan: it is clear that the main economic players in the scheme are to be 
large foreign companies, attracted by preferential terms and perhaps subsidized by 
rich-country taxpayers. They, in turn, may buy from host-country suppliers who hire 
refugees. But there is little scope for refugees to be anything but laborers in this 
model: how this will incubate recovery is unclear. One might also expect host 
country governments to object when international companies they have subsidized 
to operate in SEZs shift production over the border once peace returns. Betts and 
Collier flag this issue up, only to dismiss it: “Fortunately, global capitalism does not 
work like that: it is not a zero-sum game” (189). As ever, they are impatient with 
political realities.  
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Meanwhile, their suggestion that political recovery can be incubated by organizing 
Syrian refugees into toy parliaments-in-exile with “real” though strictly limited 
responsibilities (196) is grossly condescending. The bitter struggle for survival that 
the war has triggered, and the geopolitical rivalries that have sustained it, are not 
petty squabbles that can be neutralized by letting the children vote on how to spend 
their pocket money. The absence of any meaningful consultation with Syrian 
refugees is all too obvious in this risibly implausible plan for running their lives. 
 
Ironically, given Betts and Collier’s derision of the agency elsewhere, the toy 
parliaments plan depends for its implementation on the oversight of UNHCR. Like 
their plans for refugees, their assumptions about UNHCR and their plans for its 
future all too clearly indicate the absence of any consultation with its staff. As far as I 
can tell, in the whole main text of the book there is not a single example of a quote 
from or meeting with any of the agency’s staff, whether in the field or at 
headquarters. And yet the authors allow themselves an almost unbounded attack on 
the agency. As I noted earlier, that attack is largely misplaced: as well as ignoring 
UNHCR’s long-term commitment to just the kind of “development” approach that 
Betts and Collier claim to espouse, it also deliberately ignores the determining 
constraints placed on the agency by states. The authors’ willful neglect of the chief 
constraint on international governance persists in their chapter on “rethinking” the 
institution, making their plans not just sketchy and speculative but unrealistic too. 
For two authors who relentlessly present themselves as hard-nosed and practical 
realists (as opposed to the moralizing New York Times editorialists, sanctimonious 
and “saintly” human rights defenders, the boringly procedural lawyers, and poor 
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giddy Angela Merkel with her “headless heart”), the utter implausibility of their 
proposals is striking. “Realism” is a well-established approach in Alex Betts’s home 
discipline, international relations. It is a limited and limiting one, but even the 
narrow analysis that is possible within a realist framework immediately reveals how 
unrealistic this book’s proposals are. Realists stress the primacy of states in 




On one level it is important to respond to this book’s arguments. We should stress 
that to be effective, assistance to refugees must recognize both the diversity of 
situations they face and the range of skills and experiences they individually bring to 
them. We should note that while states are not the only actors in international 
politics, they are the most powerful: any analysis that willfully ignores this fact is 
untenable, as is any proposal for reforming international governance that aligns 
itself only with the most selfish interests of the most powerful states. We should 
make clear that supporting refugees in their efforts to rebuild their lives cannot be 
done through a one-size-fits all technocratic solution that relies implausibly on the 
goodwill of rich states and generosity of multinational corporations, but must 
instead combine humanitarian and development assistance with patient and 
unrewarding work in multilateral organizations and in the courts of host countries 
and rich countries alike to defend refugees’ rights and increase the effective 
protection afforded by the 1951 Convention. We should recognize that when rich 
countries try to exclude refugees from their own territories, they encourage major 
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host states to adopt hostile and restrictive policies towards refugees too. We should 
argue that when rich countries enact such restrictive policies towards refugees (and 
other migrants) at their borders, it does not open political space for providing 
greater economic assistance to those kept at a distance, but rather rewards and 
encourages the most xenophobic and isolationist currents in our politics. Most of all, 
we should make clear that any proposal to improve the lives of the world’s refugees 
needs to start by talking to refugees, not David Cameron, King Abdullah or “the 
world’s business leaders at Davos”. 
 
But on another level, such a response would be missing the point, because it 
assumes that Betts and Collier are making an argument in good faith, with the aim of 
helping refugees. They are not. No-one with the constructive aim of improving the 
current international system of refugee protection could allow themselves such a 
tendentious and ill-informed account of its origins and functioning, or so wholly 
ignore its key actors. No-one with the constructive aim of making UNHCR better 
could allow themselves such a partial and hostile account of what it actually does 
and why, ignoring both its long-term commitment to development assistance for 
refugees and (more important) the constraints placed on it by states. No-one with 
the constructive aim of helping refugees could so casually dispense with rights-based 
protections, so ruthlessly insist on stripping them of any control over where they live 
and how, or listen to so few of them while writing a book this long.  
 
The refugee system is operating, as usual, at breaking point. Constructive and well-
founded arguments to reform it could vary enormously. They might stress the 
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responsibilities of different actors, making more cautious or more radical demands 
on states, envisaging a larger or smaller role for civil society, the private sector, 
governments, and international agencies. They might differ over the rights and 
obligations of refugees, of states, and of citizens. From such a well-informed debate, 
creative new solutions to the problems that refugees face might emerge. This book, 
however, is not making a constructive argument. The speculative and implausible 
“reforms” it proposes are no more than a pretext for an attack on UNHCR, an attack 
on the 1951 Convention, an attack on refugees’ rights—which is to say, an attack on 
human rights, within a narrowly economistic and exploitative worldview. And the 
purpose of this destructive argument is not to help refugees, but to keep them out 
by any means possible. 
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1 For UNHCR’s historic figures on refugee numbers, see http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview 
(accessed 13 Feb 2018). 
2 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, which attempts to gather reliable statistics, has only 
been operating since 1998: http://www.internal-displacement.org/about-us/ (accessed 13 Feb 2018). 
3 The former explicitly states (article VIII.2) that ‘The present Convention shall be the effective 
regional complement in Africa of the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees.’ 
4 The agency has also published a number of evaluations of the implementation of these policies, 
which are readily available online. Betts and Collier briefly mention the 2009 policy, dismissing it as 
having “little impact on the lives of most urban refugees” (141) without discussing the constraints on 
its implementation. They do not mention the policy on alternatives to camps at all. 
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5 The flight of Rohingya from Myanmar is mentioned, but attributed to “inter-ethnic tensions [rather] 
than to state repression”, blamed on “majority violence from which the state was unwilling, and 
possibly unable, to protect them” (28). This whitewashing of the historical persecution of Rohingya by 
the Burmese state and its security forces shows just how far Betts and Collier are ready to take their 
refusal to attribute any responsibility, ever, to the actions of states. 
6 The first two pieces cited here appeared in November 2015: Betts and Collier cite neither. That 
year’s refugee flows also triggered fiscal stimulus across Europe in another form: the allocation of 
enormously increased sums to border security at the level of the EU and of individual states. 
7 Detailing the way foreign intelligence services became mesmerized by the threat of ISIS, Hersh 
shares their mesmerization, and consequently downplays the Syrian regime’s brutality. 
8 All figures are the most recent available at time of revision—usually 2016 or 2017—from 
http://reporting.unhcr.org/ (accessed 13 Feb 2018). 
9 This paragraph owes much to discussions with Ann-Christin Wagner, who did a year of ethnographic 
fieldwork with Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities in 2016. 
